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LORETTA GALLENT,

]
)

Case No. 930776-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Trial Court No. 920000001

GARY M. BRIGGS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 15

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
The District Court entered its Memorandum Decision on
August 5, 1993 followed by a Memorandum Decision on September 9,
1993, and one on September 15, 1993.

The Order was filed the same

day, September 15, 1993.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Defendant in this case has shifted positions regarding
which state's law applies several times.

First, it was Utah (see

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, Rec. 171),
then Colorado or Texas (see Defendant's Reply Memorandum, Rec.
210), then Louisiana and Texas (see Hearing Tr. p. 24), then Texas
(see Brief of Appellant).

The District Court held that since the

action was based on contract, the action was timely filed in any of
these states. The Defendant conceded at the hearing on the Motions
for Summary Judgment that there was no statute of
problem if this is an action based on contract.

limitations

(Hearing

Tr. p. 26, lines 5-6; pp. 37-38)

See Allen v. Greyhound Lines,

Inc., 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978), where the Supreme Court would not
disturb the trial court's findings on applicability of statute of
limitations when supported by substantial, competent evidence.
POINTS II AND III
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Defendant fails to state that the District Court found
that there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and
that was the basis for granting summary judgment.

That is the

standard set forth in Heqlar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P. 2d 1390
(Utah 1980), (summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and
all other submissions, such as depositions, affidavits, etc., show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and this
does not preclude summary judgment simply whenever

"some fact

remains in dispute").
POINT IV
JOINDER OF THIRD PARTIES
The standard of review in this area is that a trial court? s
determination properly granted under Rule 19 will not be disturbed
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

Seftel v. Capital City

Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Landes v.
Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990).
STATUTES
The text of the following statutes is set forth in Addendum A
attached hereto:

6 Del. C. §§ 8-301, 8-302, 8-317, and 8-319(d),

Louisiana Civil Code art. 1832, 1759, 3133, 3141;

Utah Code Ann.

§§ 70A-8-301, 70A-8-302, 70A-8-317, 70A-8-319(d), 78-12-35, and 7812-45.
-?.-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts
1.

Defendant's statement of facts relating to the year 1981

fails to mention that he became aware of the limited partnership
while he was in Louisiana which is where he lived before going to
California for a short time and he returned to Louisiana and lived
there (with a short period of time in Colorado) before finally
moving to Texas.
2.

(Depo. Tr. pp. 6-8.)

Defendant was living in Lafayette, Louisiana in 1986 when

the offer was made

to discount

promissory note. (Ex. 1A. )

the Crane

Limited

Partnership

The letter accepting the offer was

mailed to the attorney handling the matter in Lafayette, Louisiana.
(Ex. 4.)

Digicrane, Inc. was a Louisiana corporation that was a

wholly owned subsidiary of Digitran, Inc.
3.

(Ex. 19, p. 1, 1[4. )

The relationship between the various entities and the

nature of the transaction entered into by the Defendant in this
case are all set forth clearly in the offering circular included as
Ex. 19 in Defendants deposition and the AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS
A OR CLASS B NOTE which was signed by Defendant in connection with
the offering is set forth in Ex. 4 (Addendum B) of Defendant's
deposition.
4.

(Depo. Tr. pp. 34-38.)

When Defendant prepaid $30,400 under the AGREEMENT TO

PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B NOTE

(Ex. 4 ) , he was released

from

further obligations on the note which was due on December 31, 1990
and was promised $30,400 worth of stock in Digitran, Inc. at $.75
per share (or 40,533 shares of stock).
line 14.)

-3-

(See Depo. Tr. p. 29,

5. Because of securities law restrictions on the issuance of
stock in Digitran, Inc. at that time, the delivery of the 40,533
shares was delayed.

(See Plaintiff's affidavit, Rec. 205, Depo.

Tr. 42.)
6.

When the delivery was delayed, Defendant went to the

Digitran office in Lafayette, Louisiana (Depo. Tr. p. 41, lines 2425) where at Defendant's insistence, Plaintiff delivered a stock
certificate representing 32,190 shares in Digitran, Inc. (which
shares were owned by her personally) "as security that good faith
performance would be followed through with by Digitran/Digicrane."
(Quoting Defendant's deposition, Tr. p. 42, line 19-20.

See also

Depo. Tr. p. 57, line 21.)
7.

The stock power which Plaintiff signed at the time was

obtained by Defendant who was working with Merrill Lynch as a stock
broker and was done at the insistence of Defendant so that it would
be effective as security or collateral.

(Depo. Tr. p. 42, line 3

and Depo. Tr. p. 57, line 21.)
8.

The Defendant describes the security arrangement as

something other than an irrevocable transfer:

"I would have the

option to use it [the stock] as my own if I felt it necessary to
fulfill unpaid debts relative to Digicrane/Digitran." And the time
for exercising this option (or default on the security agreement)
was uncertain.
9.

(See Depo. Tr. p. 44-45, lines 17-25 and 1-15.)

The underwriting process continued through 1988 and

various documents were prepared and forwarded to Defendant for his

-4-

information and signature.

(See Exs. 8, 9, 10, 20, 21, 22, 32, and

33. )
10.

Because of the delay, Defendant was paid

$1,824 in

interest. (See Ex. 8 and Depo. Tr. p. 53, lines 3-5.)
11.

On November 22, 1988, 40,533 newly issued shares of stock

in Digitran,

Inc. was

issued

to Defendant.

(See

Plaintiff's

affidavit, Rec. 205, Depo. Tr. p. 42.)
12.

The stock certificate 4206 issued on August 8, 1990, for

32,190 shares, represents the shares which were pledged to secure
issuance of the 40,533 shares issued on November 22, 1988.

The

pledged stock was to have been returned to Plaintiff at that time.
Plaintiff did not discover that the pledged stock had been put into
Defendant's name until she was reviewing stock transfers which had
been sent to her by the stock transfer agent some time later.

(See

Exs. 11, 12, 13, and 14 and Plaintiff's affidavit, Rec. 205.)
13.

Plaintiff was involved in the relocation of Digitran,

Inc. from Louisiana to Utah at the time and believed that her
secretary had retrieved her stock from Defendant at the time the
new shares were issued.
14.

(See Plaintiff's affidavit, Rec. 205.)

Defendant was served personally in Utah with the summons

and complaint.

(See return on service, Rec. 006.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I

The Defendant argues that Utah's borrowing statute bars the
Plaintiff's action, but fails to acknowledge the exception set
forth in the statute (Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-45) which is that it

-5-

affords the protections of Utah law to Utah residents who incur
causes of action outside the state •
Plaintiff is now a Utah resident.
Inc., 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978).

That is the case here since

See Allen v. Greyhound Lines,
He also ignores the triggering

event for the running of the statute of limitations, namely the
transfer of the 32,190 shares of stock into his name on August 23,
1990 which would make the filing of the action timely even under
the Texas two year statute for conversion.

The District Court did

not even reach that issue because the Court found that Plaintiff's
action was based

on contract

and

therefore, as conceded

by

Defendant, would come under the shortest statute on contracts--four
years.
The state with the most significant contacts and the focus of
all the activities until Plaintiff moved to Utah is Louisiana which
has a ten year statute on pledge agreements. This is also the law
which would be "borrowed" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-45 for the
benefit of Plaintiff.
POINT II
Defendant

misstates

the basis

for

the District

decision granting Plaintiff summary judgment.

Court's

It is very clear

from the transcript of the hearing and the Court's memorandum
decisions that summary judgment was granted because there was no
dispute as to any material facts as set forth with particularity on
pages 2-4 in the Court's August 4, 1993 Memorandum Decision.
(Rec. 244-246.)

-6-

In addition, Defendant fails to acknowledge the difference
between parol evidence and extrinsic evidence.

The District Court

utilized

starting

documents

signed

by

the Defendant

with

the

AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B NOTE in clarifying what
transpired between the parties.

The only parol evidence which was

considered came from Defendantf s own deposition and was used to
explain the relationship of the Irrevocable Stock Power to the
transaction between the parties.

Ex. 34, which seems to be a big

issue for Defendant, is not even considered by the District Court
in its ruling,
POINT III
Not only did the Court not err in setting forth clearly the
undisputed facts on which it based its ruling, but clarified them
in the Findings of Fact, which is what is required under the cases
cited by Defendant.

The Court identified the parts of the record

which sustained its findings that the facts are undisputed.

The

cases clearly hold that a trial court may consider, in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the pleadings, depositions, affidavits
and admissions on file.

The facts not in dispute clearly are

sufficient to sustain the District Court's ruling.
POINT IV
The Defendant continually tries to bring issues into this case
which the District Court earlier ruled were not relevant since they
did not relate to the parties in the instant case.

The Defendant

filed a motion to join additional parties which the court duly
considered and denied.

This ruling was based on sound reasoning
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and should not be disturbed since it did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED UNDER ANY
OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
The key issue as discussed in detail at the hearing on the
Motions for Summary Judgment and as conceded by Defendant!s counsel
is whether this is an action covered by the limitations statute on
contracts.

(See Hearing Tr. pp. 26, 37-38.)

If it is, then the

limitations statutes of Louisiana, Texas, Colorado and Utah are all
at least four years and the action was timely filed.
fact, what the District Court found.

That is, in

(See Findings of Fact, VI,

Rec. 259-260, and Hearing Tr. pp. 46-47, lines 25, 1-3.)
Under
Plaintiff's

any

analysis,

including

complaint was timely

asserted in his Memorandum Re:
(Rec.

171), that

the

Utah

conflict

filed.

of

laws

Initially,

rules,

Defendant

Motion for Summary Judgment
statute

of

limitations

applied.

Plaintiff, in response, cited Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 which tolls
an action when a person is absent from the state.
v. Shaffer, 742 P. 2d 111 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Tripp, 95 P. 520 (1908).

See Van Tassell

See also, Lawson v.

Under this statute the time would be

tolled from the time Digitran, Inc. moved to Utah in 1988 until now
except for the few days that Defendant has been in the state for
stockholder meetings or his deposition.
that Texas or Colorado law must apply.
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Defendant then decided
(See p. 4, Rec. 210, of

Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum, "The cause of action
in this case did not accrue in the State of Utah but accrued in the
State of Colorado or Texas which are the residences of the
Defendant at the time of the transaction.") Then it was Louisiana
or Texas (Hearing Tr. p. 24) and finally, Texas in his appeal
brief.
Even under Defendant's shotgun approach, the calculations are
faulty.

The agreement which commenced this whole transaction was

signed by Defendant on or about December 3, 1986.
4 and Depo. Tr. p. 37.)

(See Depo. Ex.

The pledge of Plaintiff's stock was

entered into October 8, 1987, but according to Defendant's own
testimony, the trigger on when he could exercise his "option" to
redeem the collateral
uncertain.

if Digitran, Inc. did not perform was

In fact, the actual transfer of the stock certificate

which was pledged, namely certificate number 2939, was not effected
until August 23, 1990, after Digitran's obligation was already
satisfied.

The law is clear that a transfer of stock requires

the following steps: (1) indorsement and delivery of the stock
certificate by the transferor to the transferee; (2) delivery of
the stock certificate by the transferee to the transfer agent of
the corporation for registration in its books; (3) examination of
the certificate by the transfer agent; (4) recordation of the
transfer; and (5) cancellation of the old certificate and delivery
of the new certificate to the transferee.
Stud. Summary of Utah Corporate Law §6.35

See, B.Y.U.J. Legal
(1982).

Assuming

arguendo that Defendant converted Plaintiff's stock, this did not

-9-

occur until Defendant requested the issuance of the stock in his
name and the stock was issued on August 23, 1990.
11.)

(See Depo. Ex.

This action was filed January 3, 1992, so even under the

Texas two year statute relating to conversion this action was
timely filed.
However, neither Texas or Colorado meet the criteria set forth
in Defendant's own brief.
which

should

be

applied

If the criteria for establishing the law
is

as

set

forth

by

Defendant,

examination of those criteria leaves Texas and Colorado
lacking.

an

sadly

Until Digitran, Inc. and the plaintiff moved to Utah all

of the significant
original contract

contacts relating

to the execution of

the

(the AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B

NOTE); the pledge of the stock to secure the original contract; the
payment of the interest because of the delay; and the delivery of
the 40,533 shares in satisfaction of the original contract took
place in Louisiana.

The only act which did not involve Louisiana

was the transfer of stock certificate 2939 by Defendant in 1990
effected by him through the stock transfer agent in New York.

The

only contact with Texas is that is where the Defendant was living
at that time.

All of the other transactions occurred while he was

in Louisiana or Colorado.

At all times the Plaintiff's residence

and the principal office of Digitran, Inc. was either in Louisiana
or Utah.

In fact, the borrowing statute cited by Defendant, Utah

Code Ann, § 78-12-45 would allow the action to be maintained in
this state even if it had expired in Louisiana.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978).)
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(See Allen v.

However, it had not expired in Louisiana.

The statute of

limitations, (known in Louisiana as the prescriptive period) is ten
years as set forth in the following analysis. Since Louisiana does
not adhere to the common law doctrine evidenced by the Statute of
Frauds because it follows the Napoleonic traditions of a Civil
Code, the law of obligations governs contracts within the state.
Generally, Louisiana law does not require that a contract be in
written form, and it may be proved by testimony, or by presumption.
La.Civ. Code art. 1832.

Moreover, good faith shall govern the

conduct of the parties in whatever pertains to the obligation.
La.Civ. Code art. 1759.
The District Court found that a contract had been entered into
between the parties regarding
shares

to Defendant.

delivery

of

this

the ultimate delivery of

Thereafter,

stock,

Plaintiff

because

of

a delay

entered

into

a

40,533
in

the

pledge

(or

security agreement) relating to 32,190 shares of her own personal
stock pending

issuance of the stock

Digitran, Inc.

in favor of Defendant by

Under Louisiana law, a pledge is a contract by

which one debtor gives something to his creditor or the creditor of
another as security for a debt or obligation.
3133, 3141.

La. Civ. Code arts.

Louisiana courts agree that the prescriptive period

(i.e., period of limitations) in such a case is ten years.

See,

Franklin v. Bridges Loan and Investment Company, Inc., 371 So. 2d
294 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
Not only would the Defendant? s assertion that the execution of
the stock power constitute a completed transfer be inconceivable
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under Louisiana law, but there are thousands of brokers around the
country who hold their clients' stock who would be surprised.

In

light of the fact that Defendant was a licensed stock broker and
understands the fiduciary responsibility which a broker has to
ascertain the nature of the arrangement under which stock and stock
powers are delivered, it appears disingenuous at best to assert the
stock transfer was effected on October 8, 1987.

Defendant has

already admitted in his deposition that Plaintiff's personal stock
was

delivered

as

security

to

assure

performance

by

Digicrane/Digitran.
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS NO TENABLE BASIS ON WHICH
TO ASSERT A BAR TO INTRODUCTION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
Defendant misconstrues the District Court's decision in this
case.

The Court clearly stated that the basis for granting summary

judgment was a finding that there were no material facts which were
in dispute.

(Hearing Tr. pp. 59-60; August 5, 1993 Memorandum

Decision, Rec. 244; Findings of Fact, Rec. 261.) The Court clearly
outlined the facts not in dispute on pages 2-4 of the August 5,
1993 Memorandum Decision (Rec. 261-263).
The Defendant attempts to direct attention away from the basic
agreement.

That agreement was signed by the Defendant and his wife

on December 3, 1986 and is entitled AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR
CLASS B NOTE.

As stated by the Court in the Memorandum Decision,

It is undisputed that Defendant entered into an
agreement to prepay the class note to Digitran. As
a part of the agreement Defendant elected to pay
$30,400, half the value of the original note, in
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cash to Crane Development Limited Partnership. The
following was part of the consideration given to
Defendant for the prepayment:
(1) Defendantf s
promissory note would be canceled and delivered to
him (2) Digicrane would execute an amendment to the
Guaranty and Assumption Agreement,
(3) Defendant
would receive one share of Common
Stock from
Digitran for each $0.75 contributed by Defendant in
cash
upon
the
execution
of
the
Agreement.
Defendant paid the $30,400 and was guaranteed to
receive the stock by June 1, 1986.
The Court then recites the undisputed facts surrounding the
subsequent transactions and concludes as follows:
The 32,190 shares of stock given to Defendant by
Plaintiff were admittedly given as * security for a
good faith performance.f They were delivered at a
time when Digitran had still not delivered the
40,533 shares of stock pursuant to the prepayment
agreement. There was no other clear obligation at
that time to Defendant ... .
Defendant has
received the stock promised him in the prepayment
agreement. Defendant has filed to establish why he
is entitled to retain the other 32,190 shares.
It also appears that Defendant is throwing up a red herring
when he argues that the Court's decision rested on parol evidence.
That is not what the Court said.
Memorandum

Decision

the

Court

On page 2, Rec. 244, of the

stated,

"Defendant

argues

that

exhibit 6, the Irrevocable Stock Power, is the only admissible
evidence of the transaction concerning the 32,190 shares of stock."
The Court also pointed out that the Defendant did not want any
other document or testimony to be admitted in evidence.

The Court

ruled that Ex. 6 was only one of a series of documents in a
transaction between Plaintiff and Defendant and that other evidence
should be admitted "•.. explaining the context and understanding of
the parties at the time of transfer."
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It would appear that Defendantf s

motivation in trying to

exclude extrinsic evidence (not parol evidence) has a lot to do
with the fact that documents signed by him establishes the nature
of the transaction which is the subject of this case and it is
consistent with Plaintiff's assertions.

In fact, the ruling by the

District Court is consistent with the ground rules which allow an
examination of the circumstances surrounding

this transaction.

See, Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P. 2d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); (can look
to extraneous evidence to determine intent);

Sparrow v. Tayco

Const. Co., 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah Ct.App. 1993).

The fact is

that the delivery of the stock power and stock certificate to
Defendant by Plaintiff were part and parcel of a transaction which
was commenced with the execution by Defendant and his wife of the
document entitled AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B NOTE in
December

1986.

That

agreement

contemplated

the

payment

by

Defendant of $30,400, his release from obligation on a note, and
the delivery of stock in Digitran, Inc. to him at a value of $.75
per

share.

Without

reference to that document nothing

happens after that is comprehensible.

which

There was a check paid by

Defendant to Digicrane, Inc.; a release signed by Digitran, Inc.;
an agreement to deliver shares; a pledge of stock to Defendant of
Plaintiff's personal

shares pending

availability

of new

issue

Digitran stock; and delivery of the appropriate number of shares
(40,533) to Defendant—all taking place after the signing of the
original agreement.

-14-

As set forth in Greqerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980),
several documents may be construed together notwithstanding the
fact that they are not all signed by the party to be charged as
long as some nexus is shown between them.

In that case the Court

looked to a deed which contained just the names of the parties and
a detailed legal description of some real estate but which had not
been recorded or signed to find an agreement between the parties.
The Court

stated:

convincingly

shows

"Parol
that

the

evidence will
signed

and

be considered
unsigned

if

writings

it
are

connected to one another and have been assented to by the parties."
That case is cited in Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western
Real Estate & Development Co., 779 P.2d 230 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
cited by Defendant which actually supports Plaintiff's position.
These cases go beyond what needs to be established here.

As

alluded to above, unless the transfer of the 32,190 shares of stock
was gratuitous and done in isolation from any other contact the
Plaintiff and Defendant had between themselves, it has to be placed
in the context of that relationship.
In the simplest view of this whole transaction, you merely
ascertain the number of shares Defendant was entitled to under his
agreement, namely 40,533.
did get:

Then you calculate how many he actually

72,723 shares, (and there is no assertion anywhere that

he gave any additional consideration for any additional shares)-subtract the difference: 32,190 shares, and that is what is owed to
Plaintiff.

Defendant can try to confuse the issue, but that is the

bottom line.
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In a more sophisticated fashion, the transaction as originally
formulated in Louisiana where it took place was an agreement to
convey stock, followed by a pledge which was clearly enforceable
under Louisiana law, followed by delivery of the stock, which
delivery had been secured by the earlier stock pledge, followed by
the return of the stock pledge.

Unfortunately, the Defendant was

not forthcoming with the cancellation of the stock pledge and
consequently this action had to be filed.
Defendant? s position that no parol evidence can be introduced
to explain the context for the delivery of a stock certificate and
a stock power actually misses the point. First, the District Court
ruling did look to extrinsic evidence--not parol evidence for the
establishment of an agreement.

Second, Defendant's argument is

like saying that a check for the payment of the purchase of some
property cannot be connected with the transaction to which it
relates unless it is signed by both parties.
take that position.

It is ludicrous to

That is like saying that if a person has

overpaid by mistake for an obligation that he is not entitled to a
refund because you cannot introduce extrinsic evidence to explain
the relevance of a check which constituted the overpayment.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS SOUND AND
IS BASED ON UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THE RECORD
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the District Court did not
rely on the admission of Ex. 34 to find that Defendant had breached
his agreement with the Plaintiff.
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In fact, this is what the

District Court ruled, namely that this is a contract action and was
based on the AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B NOTE, (Depo.
Ex. 4 ) .

Defendant's own characterization of the delivery of the

stock was that it was "... security for the good faith performance
... by Digicrane/Digitran."

(Depo. Tr. p. 42, lines 19-20.)

Defendant establishes the number of shares he was entitled to
under the agreement as 40,533 shares.

(Depo. Tr. p. 29, line 14.)

A stock certificate number 4111 in the amount of 40,533 shares was
duly delivered to Defendant on November 22, 1988.
affidavit, Rec. 205, Depo Tr. p. 42.)

(See Plaintiff's

An interest payment to

compensate him for delay in the amount of $1,824 was made to him in
April 1988.
performed

(See Depo. Ex. 8.)

and

Defendant

has

The agreement has been fully

failed

and

refused

to

deliver

Plaintiff's stock to her, but merely says that it is being held for
some undefinable and unquantifiable reason.

(See Depo. Tr. pp. 44-

46. )
Under Point II above, Plaintiff explains the Louisiana law
formulation of a pledge of corporate stock.
of

the

law,

Louisiana's

situation

is

As in many other areas

quite

unique.

It

is

instructive to examine the arrangement between the Plaintiff and
the Defendant in relationship to Plaintiff's personal stock as it
would generally be viewed under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.

This is the law that would be applicable in both Delaware

(Digitran, Inc.'s state of incorporation) and Utah.
While

Utah's

version

of

Article

8

was

amended

rather

extensively in 1989, and there are some conflict of laws questions
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which could be analyzed, the basic principle is the same.

Under

both Delaware and Utah law there is protection given to a "bona
fide purchaser" of

securities to whom

a stock certificate

is

transferred if said purchaser has no notice of an adverse claim or
is not aware that the transferor owns only a limited interest in
the security.

The purchaser acquires the rights in the security

which his transferor had or had actual authority to convey.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-301 and 6 Del. C. § 8-301.

See

"Bona fide

purchaser" under both Utah and Delaware law is logically defined as
"a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of any
adverse claim . . . ."

"Adverse claim" includes a claim that a

transfer was or would be wrongful or that a particular adverse
person is the owner of or has an interest in the security.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-302 and 6 Del. C. § 8-302.
the concept under section 8-301
security:

of a

"limited

See

There is also
interest" in a

"The creation or release of a security interest in a

security is the transfer of a limited interest in that security."
Section 8-317 has to do with the protection of innocent third
parties and indicates that a creditor's lien is not a restraint on
transfer to a third party for new value, but the lien applies to
the proceeds of the transfer in the hands of the secured party.
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-317 and 6 Del. C. § 8-317.

As is the

case in other areas of the law, a person who has notice of a defect
or claim cannot take free of such defect or claim.

In this case,

the Defendant cannot hide behind rules which were not intended to

-18-

protect him.

There is no way he qualifies as a bona fide purchaser

for value in good faith without notice.
Finally, there is a very interesting omission in Defendant's
brief involving the statute of frauds applicable to the sale of
investment securities.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-319(d), (which is

the same as 6 Del. C. § 8-319(d)) states an exception to the
requirement of a writing to meet the statute of frauds:
A contract for the sale of securities is not
enforceable by way of action or defense unless: ...
(d) The party against whom enforcement is sought
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in
court that a contract was made for the sale of a
stated quantity of described securities at a
defined or stated price.
Perhaps

that

is why

Defendant

changed

his

admissions

to

denials in his amended answer to Plaintiff's complaint since the
admissions establish the existence of an agreement between the
parties for a guarantee using Plaintiff's personal shares. Be that
as

it

may,

the

publication

by

Defendant

of

his

deposition

constitutes the necessary admissions, particularly the price and
number of shares he was to receive (Depo. Tr. p. 29, lines 4-14)
and the existence of a security or collateral arrangement (Depo.
Tr. p. 42, line 19-20 and Depo. Tr. p. 57, line 21).
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING NOT TO JOIN
ADDITIONAL PARTIES IS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The first motion filed by Defendant in this case trying to
obfuscate the issues was for the joinder of additional parties.
After the submission of memoranda on this issue and an examination
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of

the

parties.

record

the

District

Court

declined

to

add

additional

As set forth in Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P. 2d 941

(Utah Ct. App. 1989), afffd sub nom. Landes v. Capital City Bank,
75 P. 2d 1127 (Utah 1990), the trial court's determination properly
entered under Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
The argument made by Defendant in support of his position to
join additional parties contradicts his argument that the District
Court looked to inadmissible parol evidence. Rather than referring
to extrinsic evidence signed by the party to be charged, Defendant
would have this Court resort to parol evidence (correctly defined)
to establish some claim for royalties that is not apparent except
in Defendant's own mind.

Refusal to do so does not demonstrate an

abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
In fact, this argument was raised again in the hearing on the
motions for summary judgment, and the trial judge reiterated that
one of the bases for his earlier ruling was that a Utah court did
not even have jurisdiction over the parties which Defendant was
attempting to join.

(Depo. Tr. p. 103, lines 13-20)
CONCLUSION

Not only has Defendant failed to establish that he has any
right to the additional 32,190 shares for which Plaintiff has had
to sue, but based on the undisputed facts and the law as determined
by the District Court, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

As complicated as Defendant has tried to make this

case, it is really quite simple. Defendant signed an agreement and
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pursuant to that agreement received all that he was entitled to,
but he has failed to return the collateral, which was to guarantee
the performance

of Digitran,

Inc., to its rightful

owner

the

Plaintiff.
It is clear that the District Court's ruling is well-founded
and should be sustained.
\Cj
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*** THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1992 SUPPLEMENT
*** (1992 SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
136TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY) ***
TITLE 6. COMMERCE AND TRADE
SUBTITLE I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTICLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES
PART 3. TRANSFER
6 Del. C. @ 8-301

(1992)

-301. Rights acquired by purchaser
[1) Upon transfer of a security to a purchaser (Section 8-313), the purchaser
aires the rights in the security which his transferor had or had actual
lority to convey unless the purchaser's rights are limited by Section
)2(4).
[ 2 ) A transferee of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of
interest transferred. The creation or release of a security interest in a
irity is the transfer of a limited interest in that security.
TORY: 5A Del. C. 1953, @ 8-301; 55 Del. Laws, c. 349; 64 Del. Laws, c. 152, @
PES:
WARE STUDY COMMENT
(1) Shelter Provision. Like @ 58 of the NIL, 6 Del.C. @ 158, @ 8-301(1) of
UCC provides that if a purchaser of a security has not been a party to any
id or illegality affecting the security, he acquires such rights in the
irity as his transferor had or had power to transfer. However @ 8-301(1),
> its counterpart in @ 3-201(1) of Article 3 of the Code, denies protection
i former holder who had notice of the fraud or illegality even though he was
a participant therein.
?he definition of "adverse claim" contained in @ 8-301(1) was added to make
ir that an "adverse claim" may include one asserted by a person not himself
.tied to protection of the security.
(2) Rights Acquired By A Bona Fide Purchaser. Section 8-301(2) provides that
m a fide purchaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser also
lires the security free of any adverse claim. Under @@ 6 and 7 of the STA, 8
C. @@ 186 and 187, if the indorsement or delivery of a certificate was
lined by fraud, duress, mistake or without authority or after the owner's
:h or legal incapacity, the possession of the certificate could be reclaimed
iss the certificate had been transferred to a purchaser for value in good
;h without notice of any facts making the transfer wrongful. Section 57 of
NIL, 6 Del.C. @ 157, provided that a holder in due course held that the
;rument free from any defect of title to prior parties and free from defenses
.lable to prior parties among themselves and could enforce payment of the
;rument for the full amount against all parties liable thereon.
Jnder the Code, the protection accorded to a bona fide purchaser does not
i on the security's negotiability or non-negotiability as it does under the

6 Del. C. @ 8-301 (1992)
j. Purchasers from a bona fide purchaser and bona fide purchasers are
Dtected so long as the security qualifies as such under the provisions of @
L02, supra, irrespective of whether or not the security qualifies as a
jotiable instrument under @ 3-104 of Article 3 of the Code.
(3) Partial Transfer. Section 8-301(3) is new statutory law. It is not clear
>ther the term "limited interest" refers to quantity or quality.
^INITIONAL CROSS REFERENCES:
"Bona fide purchaser". Section 8-302.
"Delivery". Section 1-201.
"Holder". Section 1-201.
"Notice". Section 1-201.
"Party". Section 1-201.
"Person". Section 1-201.
"Purchase". Section 1-201.
"Purchaser". Section 1-201.
"Rights". Section 1-201.
"Security". Section 8-102.
TES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE ARTICLE
/ISOR'S NOTE. --The Delaware Study Comments, which appear in the bound volume,
re written in conjunction with the adoption and enactment of the Uniform
nmercial Code in 1967. These Delaware Study Comments may be, in part,
perseded by the amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code enacted by 64 Del.
tfs, c. 152.
/ISION OF ARTICLE. --64 Del. Laws, c. 152, effective July 13, 1983, repealed
a reenacted this Article, substituting present @@ 8-101 to 8-108, 8-201 to
208, 8-301 to 8-321 and 8-401 to 8-408 for former @@ 8-101 to 8-107, 8-201 to
208, 8-301 to 8-320 and 8-401 to 8-406. No detailed explanation of the changes
5e by the 1983 Act has been attempted, but, where appropriate, the historical
bations to the former sections have been added to the corresponding sections
the revised Article.
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Copyright (c) 1975-1992 by The State of Delaware
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*** THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1992 SUPPLEMENT
*** (1992 SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
136TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY) ***
TITLE 6. COMMERCE AND TRADE
SUBTITLE I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTICLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES
PART 3. TRANSFER
6 Del. C. @ 8-302

(1992)

•302. "Bona fide purchaser"; "adverse claim"; title acquired by bona fide
:haser
1) A "bona fide purchaser" is a purchaser for value in good faith and
lout notice of any adverse claim:
(a) Who takes delivery of a certificated security in bearer form or in
.stered form, issued or indorsed to him or in blank;
(b) To whom the transfer, pledge or release of an uncertificated security
registered on the books of the issuer; or
(c) To whom a security is transferred under paragraph (c), (d)(i) or (g)
lection 8-313(1).
2) "Adverse claim" includes a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful
:hat a particular adverse person is the owner of or has an interest in the
Lrity.
3) A bona fide purchaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser
:tion 8-301) also acquires his interest in the security free of any adverse
m.
4) Notwithstanding Section 8-301(1), the transferee of a particular
:ificated security who has been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting
security, or who as a prior holder of that certificated security had notice
n adverse claim, cannot improve his position by taking from a bona fide
ihaser.
ORY: 5A Del. C. 1953, @ 8-302; 55 Del. Laws, c. 349; 64 Del. Laws, c. 152, @
ES:
WARE STUDY COMMENT
ona fide purchaser is defined more broadly than the holder in due course
r @ 52 of the NIL, 6 Del.C. @ 152. Under the NIL the holder in order to
ify as a holder in due course had to take an instrument that was complete
regular upon its face, before it was overdue and without notice that it had
previously dishonored. The purchase also had to be in good faith and for
e and without any notice of any infirmity or defect in title.

6 Del. C. @ 8-302 (1992)
"Value" is more broadly defined in @ 1-201(44) of the Code than it was in @@
, 26 and 27 of the NIL, 6 Del.C. @@ 125, 126 and 127, and @ 22 of the STA, 8
L.C. @ 200.
Under the Code, even though the security is incomplete or altered and even
Dugh a purchaser obtains a security after its maturity date, he may
/ertheless qualify as a bona fide purchaser. See @@ 8-203, 8-206, supra and
305, infra.
^INITIONAL CROSS REFERENCES:
"Adverse claim". Section 8-301.
"Bearer form". Section 8-102.
"Delivery". Section 1-201.
"Good faith". Section 1-201.
"Indorsed". Section 8-308.
"Notice". Section 1-201.
"Purchaser". Section 1-201.
"Registered form". Section 8-102.
"Security". Section 8-102.
"Value". Section 1-201.
2R NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first
ution of this part, article, subtitle or title.
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*** THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1992 SUPPLEMENT
*** (1992 SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
136TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY) ***
TITLE 6. COMMERCE AND TRADE
SUBTITLE I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTICLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES
PART 3. TRANSFER
6 Del. C. @ 8-317 (1992)
-317. Creditors' rights
(1) Except to the extent otherwise provided or permitted by @@ 169 and 324 of
Le 8, @@ 365, 366 and Chapter 35 of Title 10, and subject to the exceptions
subsections (3) and (4) hereof, no attachment, sequestration or levy upon a
bificated security or any share or other interest represented thereby which
Dutstanding is valid until the security is actually seized in this State by
officer making the attachment, sequestration or levy but a certificated
arity which has been surrendered to an issuer of this State may be reached by
reditor by legal process upon the issuer in this State.
(2) An uncertificated security registered in the name of the debtor may not
reached by a creditor except by legal process upon the issuer in this State,
/ided the issuer is an issuer of this State or has its principal place of
Lness in this State.
(3) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security that is in the
session of a secured party not a financial intermediary or in an
^rtificated security registered in the name of a secured party not a
ancial intermediary or in the name of a nominee of the secured party may be
shed by a creditor by legal process upon the secured party.
(4) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security that is in the
session of or registered in the name of a financial intermediary or in an
Brtificated security registered in the name of a financial intermediary may
reached by a creditor by legal process upon the financial intermediary on
se books the interest of the debtor appears.
(5) Unless otherwise provided by law, a creditor's lien upon the interest of
sbtor in a security obtained pursuant to subsection (3) or (4) is not a
braint on the transfer of the security, free of the lien, to a third party
new value; but in the event of a transfer, the lien applies to the proceeds
bhe transfer in the hands of the secured party or financial intermediary,
ject to any claims having priority.
(6) A creditor whose debtor is the owner of an interest in a security is
Ltled to aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction, by injunction or
srwise, in reaching the interest or in satisfying the claim by means allowed
Law or in equity in regard to property that cannot readily be reached by
Lnary legal process.

6 Del. C. @ 8-317 (1992)
5T0RY: 5A Del. C. 1953, @ 8-317; 55 Del. Laws, c. 349; 64 Del. Laws, c. 152, @
)TES:
.•AWARE STUDY COMMENT
Section 8-317(1) corresponds substantially with @ 13 of the STA, except that
i STA permitted levy or attachment without actual seizure if transfer by the
.der was enjoined. Section 8-317(1), as recommended by the UCC draftsmen,
lid not permit a levy under any circumstances without physical seizure of the
:urity. Section 13 of the STA was not enacted by Delaware.
The language set forth above in the Delaware draftsmen's revision of @
$17(1) is similar to the language contained in 8 Del.C. @ 202 on "Effect on
:achment and sequestration laws" except that references to 8 Del.C. @ 169
le situs provisions of the Delaware Corporation Law) and 10 Del. Chap. 35 (the
itutory authorization for attachment) have been inserted to assure that the
Lsting law would not be changed by enactment of the Code.
Section 8-317(2) is identical to @ 14 of the STA which was enacted as 8
..C. @ 193.
^INITIONAL CROSS REFERENCES:
"Creditor". Section 1-201.
"Issuer". Section 8-201.
"Security". Section 8-201.
^ECT OF 1983 AMENDMENT. —The amendment of this section in 1983 was not
:ended to modify or affect the operation of the situs statute, 8 Del. C. @
>9, or the attachment mechanisms employed to bring stock into court. Castro
ITT Corp., Del. Ch., 598 A.2d 674 (1991).
'ENSE BY ISSUER. —The Delaware amendment to subsection (1) of this section
ms that the apparently unconditional right of a holder of a valid stock
rtificate to require a transfer of the stock on the company's books to him and
> issuance of a new certificate is, in Delaware, subject to a possible defense
the issuer: That the shares were adjudicated lost, stolen or destroyed, and
\ bond required under 8 Del. C. @ 168 and which was fixed in that adjudication
ild be insufficient fully to cover the cost, somehow measured, of the
>spective double issuance. Castro v. ITT Corp., Del. Ch., 598 A.2d 674 (1991).
IR NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first
:tion of this part, article, subtitle or title.
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TITLE 6. COMMERCE AND TRADE
SUBTITLE I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTICLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES
PART 3. TRANSFER
6 Del. C. @ 8-319

(1992)

-319. Statute of frauds
\ contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or
*nse unless:
(a) There is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is
jht or by his authorized agent or broker, sufficient to indicate that a
bract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities at
sfined or stated price;
(b) Delivery of a certificated security or transfer instruction has been
spted, or transfer of an uncertificated security has been registered and the
isferee has failed to send written objection to the issuer within 10 days
*r receipt of the initial transaction statement confirming the registration,
payment has been made, but the contract is enforceable under this provision
/ to the extent of the delivery, registration or payment;
(c) Within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the sale or
shase and sufficient against the sender under paragraph (a) has been received
bhe party against whom enforcement is sought and he has failed to send
bten objection to its contents within 10 days after its receipt; or
(d) The party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading,
bimony or otherwise in court that a contract was made for the sale of a
bed quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price.
rORY: 5A Del. C. 1953, @ 8-319; 55 Del. Laws, c. 349; 64 Del. Laws, c. 152, @
rES:
\WARE STUDY COMMENT
Jnder @ 4 of the Uniform Sales Act, 6 Del.C. @ 704, a contract for the sale
joods or choses in action of $500 or more was enforceable only if some note
nemorandum in writing of the contract or sale was signed by the party to be
cged or his agent, or in lieu of such a writing the contract was enforceable
bhere was acceptance and receipt of a part of the items of sale, or part
nent, or if the goods were to be manufactured by the seller specially for the
*r and were not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the
Lerfs business.
Section 8-319 makes material changes in the statute of frauds provisions of

6 Del. C. @ 8-319 (1992)
I of the Uniform Sales Act and in some important respects also differs from
> Statute of Frauds provision contained in @ 2-201 of the Code, supra.
Under @ 8-319(a) any contract for the sale of securities is covered
jardless of the amount. In addition a quantity and a price term must be
eluded in the writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought
his authorized agent or broker which indicates that a contract has been made
: the sale of the stock.
Section 8-319(b) differs from the comparable provision in @ 4 of the Uniform
Les Act but is substantially in accord with @ 2-201(3) (c). Section 8-319(b)
Dvides that the oral contract for the sale of a security is enforceable only
the extent that delivery of a security has been accepted or payment has been
ie.
Section 8-319(c), comparable to the provision of @ 2-201(2), supra, binds the
sipient of a confirmatory memorandum of the sale or purchase where the sender
bound by the memorandum, unless the recipient objects to its contents within
i days after its receipt. No comparable provision is found in @ 4 of the
Lform Sales Act, 6 Del.C. @ 704. The merit of such a provision is that it
aid eliminate the situation which arose under the Sales Act where the sender
a memorandum could be bound under the Statute of Frauds, but the recipient
jld choose to be bound or not be bound depending on whether or not the market
other conditions were favorable to him.
Section 8-319(d) providing that an admission in a judicial proceeding is
Eficient to make an oral contract enforceable to the extent of the stated
antity of described securities at a defined or stated price is analogous to @
201(3) (b), supra, except that @ 2-201 merely required a quantity term and did
t require a stated price term. There is no comparable provision in @ 4 of the
iform Sales Act, 6 Del.C. @ 704.
The provisions of @ 8-319 will not be applicable to the transactions between
broker and his customer unless the broker sells securities to his customer. If
a broker is merely purchasing the securities as an agent for his customer then
a relationship is one of principal and agent rather than seller and buyer and
B-319 is inapplicable.
FINITIONAL CROSS REFERENCES:
"Action". Section 1-201.
"Delivery". Section 1-201.
"Party". Section 1-201.
"Purchase". Section 1-201.
"Security". Section 8-103.
"Send". Section 1-201.
"Sign". Section 1-201.
"Written" and "writing". Section 1-201.
ER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first
stion of this part, article, subtitle or title.
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BOOK III.

CIVIL CODE
OF THE DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING THE OWNERSHIP OF THINGS
TITLE III. OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
La. C.C. art. 1759 (1992)

1759. Good faith
Jood faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor and the obligee in
:ever pertains to the obligation.
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CIVIL CODE
OF THE DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING THE OWNERSHIP OF THINGS
TITLE III. OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 5. PROOF OF OBLIGATIONS
La. C.C. art. 1832 (1992)

1832. Written form required by law
When the law requires a contract to be in written form, the contract may not
proved by testimony or by presumption, unless the written instrument has been
stroyed, lost, or stolen.

C.C. Art

3132

MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF THINGS

Art 3132. Termination of arbitration
The submission and power given to the arbitrators are put at an end by one of the following causes:
1. By the expiration of the time limited,
either by the submission or by law, though the
award should not be yet rendered.
2. By the death of one of the parties or
arbitrators.

Booktn

3. By the final award rendered by the art},
trators.
4. When the parties happen to compromise
touching the thing in dispute, or when this
thing ceases to exist
C.C. arts. 1813, 1876, 1932, 3071, 8105, 3131.
R.S. 9:4324.

TITLE XX—OF PLEDGE
Editor's note. Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial
Laws (R.S. 10:9-101 to 10:9-605) became effective on
January 1, 1990. This Chapter regulates the creation of
conventional real security in most movables and supplants
the laws governing pledge (pawn) with a single device, the
"security interest". R.S. 10:9-102 declares that all security interests, if subject to Louisiana law, are governed by
Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws.'

Editor's note. According to Section 22 of Acts 1989,
No. 137, Article 3133.1 became effective on September 1
1989.
Acts 1989, No. 137, § 20 provides:
"It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this Act
to amend the preexisting Louisiana security device laws to
accompany and accommodate implementation of Chapter 9
of the Louisiana Commercial Laws (R.S. 10:9-101, et set).)
as previously enacted under Act 528 of 1988. It is further
Art 3133. Pledge, definition
the intent of the Legislature that these preexisting Louisiana laws, including without limitation the various statutes
The pledge is a contract by which one debtor and code articles amended and reenacted under this Act,
not be expressly or impliedly repealed by Chapter 9 of the
gives something to his creditor as a security
Louisiana Commercial Laws, but that such laws remain in
for his debt
effect and be applied to preexisting secured transactions
C C arts. 1756, 1891, 1906 to 1908, 1913, 1914, 1916,
and, at times when so provided, be applied to secured
1971,2705 et seq., 2926, 3068, 3135, 3140 et seq., 3221, transactions subject to Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Com3477.
mercial Laws."
RJS. 1:59, 9:4321, 9:4331 to 9:4343, 9:5391, 9:5521 to
R.S. 1:59.
9:5538,10:9-102, 10:9-206, 10:9-307.

Art 3134. Kinds of pledge
There are two kinds of pledge:
The pawn.
The antichresis.

Art 3133.1. Relation to Chapter 9 of the
Louisiana Commercial Laws
This Title shall apply to pledges of movables
that are delivered prior to the time Chapter 9
of the Louisiana Commercial Laws becomes
effective, including without limitation those
pledges that may secure future obligations and
lines of credit, as well as to pledges entered
into on or after the time Chapter 9 of the
Louisiana Commercial Laws becomes effective
that are exempt or otherwise excluded from
coverage thereunder.
Added by Acts 1989, No. 137, § 16, eff. Sept 1,
1989. Amended by Acts 1990, No. 1079, § 7, eff.
Sept 1,1990.

CC. art 3135.
R.S. 9:4321, 9:5521 to 9:5538.

Art 3135. Pawn and antichresis distinguished
A thing is said to be pawned when a movable thing is given as security; and the antichresis, when the security given consists in
immovables.
C C . arts. 3068, 3133, 3134, 3154 et seq., 3176 et seq.
R.S. 9:4321.

For Annotatlvt Material*, »*e West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated
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C.C. Art 3146

CHAPTER 1—GE> JRAL PROVISIONS
Art 3136. Obligations
enforceable
by
pledge
Every lawful obligation may be enforced
by the auxiliary obligation of pledge.

Art 3142. Things susceptible of being
pledged
A debtor may give in pledge whatever belongs to him.

• Note error in English translation of French text; "enforced" should be "secured"
C.C. arts. 1761,1913,1983, 2004, 3138 et seq.
R.S. 1:59, 9:4331 to 9:4334, 9:5391,10:9-206.

But with regard to those things, in which he
has an ownership which may be divested or
which is subjected to incumbrance, he can not
confer on the creditor, by the pledge, any
further right than he had himself.

Art 3137. Conditional obligation as basis
for pledge
If the principal obligation be conditional,
that of the pledge is confirmed or extinguished
with it
C.C. arts. 1767 to 1776, 1913, 3138.

Art 3138. Effect of nullity of principal obligation
If the obligation is null, so also is the pledge.
C.C. arts. 3136, 3137, 3139, 3209, 3282, 3288.

Art 3139. Natural obligation as basis for
pledge
The obligation of pledge annexed to an obligation which is purely natural, is rendered
valid only when the latter is confirmed and
becomes executory.
C.C. arts. 1760 to 1762, 1842 to 1844,1948, 1950, 2302,
3036, 3138, 3282, 3288, 3295.

Art 3140. Object of principal obligation
Pledge may be given not only for an obligation consisting in money, but also for one
having any other object; for example, a surety. Nothing prevents one person from giving
a pledge to another for becoming his surety
with a third.
C.C. arts. 1971, 1972, 3068, 3133, 3297, 3298, 3506(20,
21).
R.S. 10:9-206.

Art 3141. Pledge for debt of another
A person may give a pledge, not only for his
own debt, but for that of another also.
C.C. arts. 1910,1978, 3133, 3295.
For Annotattva Materials, —

W<

C.C. arts. 2452, 2934, 3133, 3143 et seq., 3290.
C.C.P. art 426.
& S . 10:7-501,10:7-502.

Art 3143. Pledgor's rights at date of pledge
To know whether the thing given in pledge
belonged to the debtor, reference must be had
to the time when >fche. pawn was made.
C.C. arts. 3142, 3144.
R.S. 9:5391.

Art 3144. Subsequent acquisition of ownership of thing pledged
If at the time of the contract the debtor had
not the ownership of the thing pledged, but
has acquired it since, by what title soever, his
ownership shall relate back to the time of the
contract, and the pledge shall stand good.
C.C. arts. 3142, 3208, 3432.
R.S. 9:4341.

Art 3145. Pledge of property of another,
necessity for consent of owner
One person may pledge the property of another, provided it be with the express or tacit
consent of the owner.
C.C. arts. 1843,1919,1977, 2031, 2035, 2452, 2933, 2934,
3146, 3147, 3506(30).
R.S. 10:7-501, 10:7-502.

Art 3146. Implied consent of owner
But this tacit consent must be inferred from
circumstances, so strong as to have Peave] no
doubt of the owner's intention; as if he was
present at the making of the contract,* or if he
* Louisiana Statutes Annotated
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70A-8-301

70A-8-208. Effect of signature of authenticating trustee,
registrar or transfer agent.
(1) A person placing his signature upon a certificated security or an initial
transaction statement as authenticating trustee, registrar, transfer agent, or
the like, warrants to a purchaser for value of the certificated security or a
purchaser for value of an uncertificated security to whom the initial transaction statement has been sent, if the purchaser is without notice of the particular defect, that:
(a) the certificated security or initial transaction statement is genuine;
(b) his own participation in the issue or registration of the transfer,
pledge, or release of the security is within his capacity and within the
scope of the authority received by him from the issuer; and
(c) he has reasonable grounds to believe that the security is in the form
and within the amount the issuer is authorized to issue.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, a person by so placing his signature does not
assume responsibility for the validity of the security in other respects.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-208; 1989, ch.
218, § 17.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-

ment, effective April 24,1989, so rewrote Subsection (1) as to make a detailed analysis impracticable.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commerrial Code § 88.
C.J.S. — 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 253 et
seq., 444; 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1162 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Corporations ** 108,149,
466 et seq.

PART 3
PURCHASE
70A-8-301. Rights acquired by purchaser,
(1) Upon transfer of a security to a purchaser under Section 70A-8-313, the
purchaser acquires the rights in the security which his transferor had, or had
actual authority to convey unless the purchaser's rights are limited by Subsection 70A-8-302(4).
(2) A transferee of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of
the interest transferred. The creation or release of a security interest in a
security is the transfer of a limited interest in that security.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-301; 1989, ch.
218, § 18.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted
"transfer of a security to a purchaser under
Section 70A-8-313" for "delivery of a security"
in Subsection (1); substituted "unless the purchaser's rights are limited by Subsection
70A-8-302(4)" for "except that a purchaser who
has himself been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the security or who as prior

holder had notice of an adverse claim cannot
improve his position by taking from a later
bona fide purchaser" in Subsection (1); deleted
the former second sentence of Subsection (1),
construing "adverse claim"; deleted former
Subsection (2), which read "A bona fide purchaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a
purchaser also acquires the security free of any
adverse claim;" redesignated former Subsection (3) as (2); substituted "transferee" for
"purchaser" and "transferred" for "purchased"
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(2) Statements as provided in Section 70A-8-408, notices, or the like, sent
by the issuer of uncertificated securities and instructions as provided in Section 70A-8-308 are neither negotiable instruments nor certificated securities.
(3) In any action on a security:
(a) unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each signature on a
certificated security, in a necessary indorsement, on an initial transaction
statement, or on an instruction, is admitted;
(b) if the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue, the burden of
establishing it is on the party claiming under the signature, but the
signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized;
(c) if signatures on a certificated security are admitted or established,
production of the security entitles a holder to recover on it unless the
defendant establishes a defense or a defect going to the validity of the
security;
(d) if signatures on an initial transaction statement are admitted or
established, the facts stated in the statement are presumed to be true as
of the time of its issuance; and
(e) after it is shown that a defense or defect exists, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing that he, or some person under whom he claims, is a
person against whom the defense or defect is ineffective as provided in
Section 70A-8-202.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-105; 1989, ch.
218, § 6; 1991, ch. 5, § 79.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective February 11, 1991, corrected a
punctuation error in Subsection (3)(e).

PART 3
PURCHASE
70A-8-302. "Bona fide purchaser" — "Adverse claim" —
Title acquired by bona fide purchaser.
(1) A "bona fide purchaser" is a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of any adverse claim:
(a) who takes delivery of a certificated security in bearer form or in
registered form, issued or indorsed to him or in blank;
(b) to whom the transfer, pledge, or release of an uncertificated security is registered on the books of the issuer; or
(c) to whom a security is transferred under the provisions of Subsection
70A-8-313(l)(c), (d)(i), or (g).
(2) "Adverse claim" includes a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a particular adverse person is the owner of or has an interest in the
security.
(3) A bona fide purchaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser
under Section 70A-8-301 also acquires his interest in the security free of any
adverse claim.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection 70A-8-30K1), the transferee of a particular
certificated security who has been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting
the security, or who as a prior holder of that certificated security had notice of
an adverse claim, cannot improve his position by taking from a bona fide
purchaser.
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History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-315; 1989, ch.
218, S 32.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, in Subsection
(1), inserted the designations, substituted "certificated security wrongfully transferred* for
"security or" in (a), substituted ^certificated secunty representing";or security evidencing"
m ( b ) , a n d ^ a d d e d ( c ) ; m S u ^ o n ( % inserted
of a certificated security, substituted a new
certificated security" for "new security," and

deleted "the provisions of this chapter on unauthorized indorsements" following "against him
under"; in Subsection (3), substituted "certificated security, or to compel the origination of a
transfer instruction" for ,,8ecurity,,, substituted
«fae transfer of a certificated or uncertificated
8ecurit
o i n e d and ft certificated security"
^ ^
^ security"; and
for ^
oined ^
^
^
changes
lifltic
punctuation
^.
rfiouL
""^s 1 1 0 1 1 *-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commercial Code § 108.
C.J.S. — 18 C J.S. Corporations § 439, 19
CJ.S. Corporations § 1159 et seq.

A.L.R. — l i s pendens in suit to compel stock
transfer, 48 A.L.R.4th 731.
Key Numbers. — Corporations «=» 134,148,
466 et seq.

70A-8-316. Purchaser's right to requisites for registration
of transfer, pledge, or release on books.
Unless otherwise agreed, the transferor of a certificated security or the
transferor, pledgor, or pledgee of an uncertificated security on due demand
must supply his purchaser with any proof of his authority to transfer, pledge,
or release or with any other requisite necessary to obtain registration of the
transfer, pledge, or release of the security; but if the transfer, pledge, or
release is not for value, a transferor, pledgor, or pledgee need not do so unless
the purchaser furnishes the necessary expenses. Failure within a reasonable
time to comply with a demand made gives the purchaser the right to reject or
rescind the transfer, pledge, or release.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-316; 1989, ch.
218, § 33.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,1989, substituted wof a
certificated security or the transferor, pledgor,
or pledgee of an uncertificated security on due

demand must" for "must on due demand" in
the first sentence; inserted "pledge, or release"
three times in the first sentence and once in
the second sentence; inserted "pledgor, or
pledgee" in the first sentence; and made stylistic changes throughout

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commercial Code § 109.
C J . S . — 18 CJ.S. Corporations § 435 et
seq.; 19 CJJS. Corporations § 1159 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Corporations *» 130 et
seq., 466 et seq.

70A-8-317. Creditors' rights.
(1) Subject to the exceptions in Subsections (3) and (4), no attachment or
levy upon a certificated security or any share or other interest represented
thereby which is outstanding is valid until the security is actually seized by
the officer making the attachment or levy, but a certificated security which
has been surrendered to the issuer may be reached by a creditor by legal
process at the issuer's chief executive office in the United States.
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(2) An uncertificated security registered in the name of the debtor may not
be reached by a creditor except by legal process at the issuer's chief executive
office in the United States.
(3) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security that is in the possession of a secured party who is not a financial intermediary or in an uncertificated security registered in the name of a secured party who is not a financial
intermediary, or in the name of a nominee of the secured party, may be
reached by a creditor by legal process upon the secured party.
(4) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security that is in the possession of or registered in the name of a financial intermediary or in an uncertificated security registered in the name of a financial intermediary may be
reached by a creditor by legal process upon the financial intermediary on
whose books the interest of the debtor appears.
(5) Unless otherwise provided by law, a creditor's lien upon the interest of a
debtor in a security obtained pursuant to Subsection (3) or (4) is not a restraint on the transfer of the security, free of the lien, to a third party for new
value; but in the event of a transfer, the lien applies to the process of the
transfer in the hands of the secured party or financial intermediary, subject to
any claims having priority.
(6) A creditor whose debtor is the owner of an interest in a security is
entitled to aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction, by injunction or otherwise, in reaching the interest or in satisfying the claim by means allowed at
law or in equity in regard to property that cannot readily be attached or levied
upon by ordinary legal process.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-317; 1989, ch.
218, § 3 4 /
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,1989, inserted Subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5), renumbering former
Subsection (2) as present (6); in Subsection (1),
inserted "certificated" twice, inserted "Subject
to the exceptions in Subsections (3) and (4)
and substituted "reached by a creditor by legal
process at the issuer's chief executive office in

at the source"; substituted "an interest in a
security is" for "a security shall be" and "the
interest" for "such security" in Subsection (6);
and made stylistic changes throughout the section.
Cross-References. — Water stock, apporUonment
u p o n ^ e o f l a n d f redemption from
m o r t g a g e foreclosure, § 78-37-6.
p ^
W r i t 8 of attachmentf Rule8 of Civil
,
-^
p ,

the United States" for "attached or levied upon

aure

*

K u l e b4V

"

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment
and Garnishment §§ 39,305; 15A Am. Jur. 2d
Commercial Code § 110.
C.J.S. — 7 GJ.S. Attachment § 182; 21

C J.S. Creditors' Suits § 14; 33 C J.S. Executions §§ 98, 99.
Key Numbers. — Attachment *=» 165, 166;
Creditors' Suit «=> 8; Execution *=» 131, 132.

70A-8-318, No conversion by good faith conduct
An agent or bailee who in good faith, including observance of reasonable
commercial standards if he is in the business of buying, selling, or otherwise
dealing with securities, has received certificated securities and sold, pledged,
or delivered them or has sold or caused the transfer or pledge of uncertificated
securities over which he had control according to the instructions of his principal, is not liable for conversion or for participation in breach of fiduciary duty
although the principal had no right to deal with the securities.'
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History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-318; 1989, ch.
218, $ 3 5 .
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,1989, inserted "certificated" and "or has sold or caused the transfer
or pledge of uncertificated securities over

which he had control," substituted "to deal
with the securities" for "to dispose of them,"
and made punctuation changes,
Cross-References* — Bailee not liable for
good faith delivery pursuant to warehouse receipt or bill of lading, § 70A-7-404.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Bailment
A defendant was charged with obtaining
property under false pretenses where he was
asked to keep stock certificates until the owner
returnedfroma trip, but had them transferred

to his own name; a mere bailee has no authority to transfer certificates. State v. Jenson, 74
Utah 527, 280 P. 1046 (1929) (decided under
prior law),

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commercial Code $ 111.
C.J.S. — 2A CJ.S. Agency § 221; 8 CJ.S.
Bailments §§ 97, 98; 12 CJ.S. Brokers § 129
et seq.

Key Numbers. — Bailment •=» 21; Brokers
*=» 100 et seq.; Principal and Agent *=» 159(2).

70A-8-319. Statute of frauds.
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless
(a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indicate
that a contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described
securities at a defined or stated price; or
(b) delivery of the security has been accepted or payment has been
made but the contract is enforceable under this provision only to the
extent of such delivery or payment; or
(c) within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the sale or
purchase and sufficient against the sender under Paragraph (a) has been
received by the party against whom enforcement is sought and he has
failed to send written objection to its contents within ten days after its
receipt; or
(d) the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract was made for sale of a
stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-319.
Cross-References. — Contract for sale of
goods, statute of frauds, § 70A-2-201.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Oral coxl. arrangement.
Oral c.o.d arrangement whereby buyer of
stocks paid broker only when stock was delivered to buyer was not void where within 24
hours after each transaction, broker sent to

buyer written confirmation thereof and broker
never received a written objection from buyer,
Prince-Covey & Co. v. Strand, 29 Utah 2d 224,
507 P.2d 708 (1973).
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78-12-35

(b) Subsection (a) provides for actions not yet barred, and also acts
retroactively to permit actions under this section that are otherwise
barred.
(2) As used in this section, "asbestos" means asbestiform varieties of:
(a) chrysotile (serpentine);
(b) crocidolite (riebeckite);
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunerite);
(d) anthophyllite;
(e) tremolite; or
(f) actinolite.
History: C. 1953,78-12-33.5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 208, § 2.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 208 be-

came effective on Apnl 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec. 25

78-12-34. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 78-12-34 (L 1951, ch.
58, § 1, C 1943, Supp, 104-12-34), providing
that there is no limitation in actions to recover

bank deposits of money or property, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch 16, § 1.

ARTICLE 3
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state.
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state,
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after
his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the
state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-35; 1987, ch. 19, § 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Absence" from state.
—Nonresident motorists.
Applicability of section
—Nonresidents.
—Personal representative of estate.
Burden of proof.
Computation of time.
—Penods of absence.
Construction of section.
—Strict
Foreign corporation.
—Pleadings and evidence.
Laches.
—Accounting.
Purpose of section.

Residence within state
—Continual.
Proof of presence.
—Defendant's family.
—Statute tolled.
"Absence** from state.
—Nonresident motorists.
Nonresident motorists were not "absent"
from the state so as to toll running of statute of
limitations, although they left state immediately after automobile collision and remained
without state, as they had an agent in person
of secretary of state upon whom process could
have been served. Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d
254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964).
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agreement was made; (2) by the debtor/obligor
of the settlement agreement (or by a third
party at the debtor's direction); and (3) the payment was made to the creditor under the settlement agreement. Butcher v.' Gilroy, 744
P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

78-12-45

Verbal agreement
A verbal agreement or new promise based
upon a prior agreement barred by statute
comes within this section. Whitehill v. Lowe,
10 Utah 419, 37 P. 589 (1894) (decided under
prior law).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 325 et seq.
C.J.S. — 54 CJ.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 261.
A.L.R. — Promises to settle or perform as
estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 44
A.L.R.3d 482.

Promises or attempts by seller to repair
goods as tolling statute of limitations for
breach of warranty, 68 A.L.R.3d 1277.
Key Numbers. — Limitations of Actions *»
146.

78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here.
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or territory, or in a
foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon
shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who
has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the
time it accrued.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-45.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
—Counterclaim.
Act occurring in other state.
Choice of laws.
—Utah court.
Exception to section.
—Assignee of resident's claim.
—State resident.
Accrual of cause of action.
Applicability of section.
This section is a general provision applying
to causes of action that arise in a different
state and are not reduced to judgment. Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1991).
—Counterclaim.
Act occurring in other state.
Where defendant's counterclaim for malpractice occurring in Idaho was barred by the
Idaho statute of limitation, it would be barred
here under this section. Lindsay v. Woodward,
5 Utah 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619 (1956).
Choice of laws.
—Utah court
In wrongful death action by Utah resident

against Colorado residents, in which Utah
court had quasi in rem jurisdiction, Utah court
applied Utah law on matter concerning the
statute of limitations, including the tolling
thereof. Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343 (Utah
1980), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct.
397, 70 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1981).
Exception to section.
—Assignee of resident's claim.
Resident of Utah, who acquired claim upon
which he based his right of action by virtue of
assignment after cause of action had accrued
thereon, did not come within exception to this
section. Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P. 520
(1908).
—State resident
Accrual of cause of action.
Only those persons who are Utah residents
as of the date their cause of action arises come
within the exception to this section. Allen v.
Greyhound Lines, 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978).

287

ADDENDUM B

AGREEMENT TO PREPAY CLASS A OR CLASS B NOTE
The undersiqned is aLimited Partner in Crane Development
Limited Partnership and owns O / ^ e - C O Unit(s) in such
PartnershiD.
The undersianed hereby agrees to prepay the Class A or
Class B Note contributed to the Partnership upon its formation, on
the followinq terms and conditions:
The undersiqned submits with this aqreement (check as
applicable) :
U
/v

I elect to pay all cash. I submit cash in
the amount of $34, DOfl per Unit or $
by check made payable to Crane Development
Limited Partnership.
I elect to pay no cash immediately. I attach a
promissory note in the principal amount of
$38,000 per Unit.
I elect to pay partially in cash and partially
bv execution of a promissory note. I enclose
cash in the amount of $
. I also
attach a promissory note in the principal
amount of $
, determined by the
following formula:

Amount of Investor Note = £1 - amount of cash paid! X $38,000
$34,500
The undersiqned further represents that all material documents, includinq the Private Placement Memorandum, date October
30, 1986, records, books, and any materials which he has requested
pertaininq to this investment have been made available to him; and
that they have been reviewed by him or his advisors prior to
sianing this document, and he has had the opportunity to ask
Questions of the principals of Diqitran or the Partnership.
Except as disclosed to the Partnership and Digitran in
writina, the undersiqned warrants that the Common Stock to be
acauired by him is to be made solely on his own behalf for investment purposes of further re-sale or with a view to distribution or
fractionalization thereof.
The undersiqned is aware that the Common Stock is hiqhly
speculative, and subject to substantial risks, and that he is
capable of bearinq the hiqh degree of economic risk and burdens of
such acquisition, including, but not limited to, the possibility
of the comolete loss of all capital; the loss of all anticipated
tax benefits and any adverse tax consequences; the lack of a
(62)

public market; and limited transferability such that it might not
be possible to readily licruidate this investment so that his
ownership thereof miqht continue indefinitely.
No federal or state agency has made any finding or determination as to the fairness for public investment nor any recommendation or endorsement of the Common Stock; and the Common Stock
has not been reqistered with the Securities and Exchange
C o m m i s s i o n or with any state agency; nor is any registration to
be obtained in the future.
I understand

that, in consideration of this prepayment:

(i) DiqiCrane, Inc. will cancel and deliver to the
Partnership, for return to me, mv Class A or Class B Note;
(ii) DiqiCrane, Inc. and I will execute an amendment to my
Guaranty and Assumption Aareement, so that I will guarantee only
so much of the Partnership Note as is evidenced by my Investor
Note (in principal and interest);
(iii) The Partnership Note will be credited by DigiCrane,
Inc. with an amount eaual to the difference between:
(A) the
outstanding principal balance on any Class A or Class B Note; and
(B) the total of cash and the principal amount of my Investor
Note;
(iv) -Diqitran will issue to me its shares of Common Stock,
as follows:
(A) I will receive one share of Common Stock for each
$0.75 contributed by me in cash upon execution of this Agreement.
(B) As I pav installment payments on mv Investor Note, I
will be entitled to have issued to me a number of shares of the
Common Stock of Diqitran Systems, Inc. determined by reference to
the last price, as published in the OTC "Pink Sheets" as of the
last day of the calendar quarter immediately preceding such
installment payment.
I will receive shares at such price, less a
10% discount. Common Stock will be issued to me promptly after
the end of the quarter in which such installment payments are
made.
(v) I aqree that my Investor Note may be paid or prepaid
out of any cash distributions made to me by the Partnership.
(vi) I hereby waive and forever discharge any and all
claims which I mav have had, whether known or unknown, liquidated
or continqent, aqainst the Crane Development Limited Partnership;
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Diaitran Systems, Inc.; Diqitran, Inc.; DigiCrane, Inc.; their
officers, employees, aqents or attorneys, in relation to mv
aqreeinq to become, or becominq a Limited Partner in the
Partnership, or in relation to my execution and delivery of my
Class A or Class B Note.
(vii) I understand that the Common Stock to be issued to
me will not be reqistered; that it will be "restricted" under Rule
144 of the Securities Act of 1933; that it will not be freely
transferable; and that the stock certificate will bear a legend to
that effect.
(viii)
transaction.

I also understand that this is a taxable

(ix) I represent that I have read the Private Placement
Memorandum dated November 10, 1986, and that I have obtained competent advice with regard to those portions of the memorandum
which I did not understand. I acknowledge that there exist certain risk factors and conflicts of interest. I represent that my
correct domicile and address is as stated belov

SIGNATURE OF INVESTOR

PRINTED NAME __, /p

ADDRESS
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